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While peace talks between Syria’s government and opposition bump 
along in Geneva, battles rage on the ground and the death toll and 
the refugee wave rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks, 
but can it keep its eyes — and borders — closed to the men, women 
and children fleeing Syria? How can Europe better respond to the 
human and political disaster looming on its external border?
The conflict began when, three years ago, a handful of children wrote 
anti-regime slogans on the board of their classroom in the southern 
town of Deraa. This event triggered an implacable spiral of repres-
sion and protest and the conflict in Syria has now forcibly moved 7 
million people from their homes, including 4.5 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and 2.5 million refugees who have fled 
abroad.1 As in all refugee crises, the vast majority of those who do 
not get trapped inside the country find themselves stuck on just the 
other side of the border. The bulk of Syrian refugees is sheltered 
among four of Syria’s five neighbors: Lebanon, the main receiver 
where more than 900,000 refugees are registered with UNHCR and 
where many others have not been registered; Turkey and Jordan 
each of them with close to 600,000 refugees; and Iraq with around 
220,000 refugees. Israel, which is at war with Syria, has, to date, kept 
its border closed.
1. Numbers are continuously increasing. Regular updates are provided: for IDPs 
by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at http://
www.unocha.org/crisis/syria; for refugees in countries neighbouring on Syria 
by the UN Refugee Agency at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.
php; and for refugees in the EU by Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database.
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Other refugees have travelled further away and to 
destinations where they have relatives or friends. 
Thus some 135,000 Syrian refugees are currently 
hosted by Egypt, and tens of thousands find them-
selves in the Maghreb countries. By contrast, Europe’s 
response to the refugee crisis has been limited and 
uneven. Moreover, it has been constantly outpaced 
by events on the ground and riddled with obstacles, 
as shown by Table 1.
First, Europe has only taken in a small part (2.9 
percent) of the overall Syrian refugee population. 
Between March 2011 and December 2013, the 28 
Member States (MS) of the European Union (EU) 
received 69,740 asylum claims from Syrian citizens 
and made 41,695 positive decisions. These numbers 
are not small in absolute terms, but they represent 
just a fraction of the 2,301,533 Syrian refugees that 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt sheltered 
over the same period.
Second, European nations have responded to the 
refugee crisis in an uneven fashion. Only two states 
took two thirds of all asylum seekers accepted by 
the 28 Member States: Sweden and Germany with 
respectively 23,110 and 20,700 claims received 
and with 11,495 and 16,610 positive decisions. A 
third state, Bulgaria, deserves a mention as it has 
received 4,545 claims since the beginning of the 
crisis, 70 percent of them arrived in the four months 
between August and November 2013 (at the time 
of writing data for December 2013 are not available 
for Bulgaria). Another nine states received between 
1,000 and 3,500 claims each and the remaining 16 
states fewer than 1,000, including Lithuania and 
Austria which did not receive a single asylum seeker 
from Syria.
Third, while asylum opportunities offered to Syrians 
in Europe have grown, these opportunities have not 
kept up with the war. Before the uprisings, there 
had always been a regular flow of Syrians seeking 
asylum in Europe. When the refugee crisis gained 
momentum in the second half of 2011, pre-existing 
flows simply amplified so that the EU28 received 
almost one third of the Syrian refugees in the first 
year of the crisis. But Europe did not open the door 
to refugees in proportion to their flight from Syria 
and its share of the overall refugee flows fell from 
29.4 percent in 2011 to 4.1 percent in 2012, to a 
measly 2.3 percent in 2013.
Fourth, obstacles that Syrian asylum seekers meet 
on their way to the EU have increased. Indeed, there 
Table 1. Flows of Syrian refugees into Syria’s neighboring countries and Europe (2011-13)
Destination / year 2011 2012 2013 03.15.2011 - 12.31.2013
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt (1) 15,455 491,651 1,799,882 2,301,533
EU 28 Member States (2) 6,450 20,810 42,480 69,740
Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece and Italy (3) 947 8,509 18,972 28,428
EU 28 / Total % 29.4 4.1 2.3 2.9
Smuggled by sea / asylum claims % 14.7 40.9 44.7 40.8
1) UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. At the time of writing (10 Feb 
2014), the total number of registered Syrian refugees in the five countries was 2,430,100.
2) EUROSTAT, Asylum and new asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Monthly data, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/portal/population/data/database.
3) Italian Ministry of Interior and Greece Police records.
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is a striking discrepancy between two facts. On the 
one hand, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers 
who are able to lodge a claim in the EU are granted 
refugee status or temporary protection (86.7 percent 
of positive decisions in 2011-13), which is a sign of 
openness. On the other hand, the number of Syrian 
refugees who turn to smugglers to reach Europe has 
soared since the beginning of the crisis, something 
which is, of course, a sign of closure. The ratio of 
Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece or Italy, compared 
to those regularly seeking asylum in the EU28, has 
jumped from 14.7 percent in 2011 to 40.9 percent in 
2012 and 44.7 percent in 2013.
Put in other terms, 44.7 percent of those who sought 
asylum in Europe last year were only able to reach 
the territory of a Member State—a legal obligation 
for claiming asylum—by putting their lives at risk 
at sea with smugglers. That their number jumped 
from 947 in 2011 to 8,509 in 2012 and 18,972 in 
2013 must be interpreted as a response to obstacles 
set up by Greece and Bulgaria at their land-border 
with Turkey, be those obstacles police patrols or wire 
fences. Greece is a case in point. In the three years 
since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Greek 
police and port authorities have arrested 16,211 
Syrian refugees smuggled by sea, almost all of them 
trying to reach another European destination, as 
Greece has a reputation for not granting asylum 
to Syrians (25 cases of positive decisions for 1,015 
claims received).
Europe is currently discussing burden-sharing, or 
‘responsibility-sharing’ between those Member 
States that are exposed by geography to irregular 
entries, and those that are not. While this discussion 
will be crucial to improve the Common European 
Asylum System, its results will come too late to 
address a refugee crisis that risks undermining or 
even overturning fragile states in the Middle East. 
The current situation is grim and the near future 
promises to see the conflict get, if anything, worse.
Countries of first asylum in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean are under extreme strain due to the massive 
influx of refugees and the pressure they exert on 
housing, food, water, schools, hospitals, etc. not to 
mention security and the social order. It has to be 
remembered that the Syrian refugee crisis comes just 
after the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2006-2009, which had 
displaced around two million Iraqi citizens towards 
the very same countries: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Turkey and Egypt. In addition, the two crises come 
in countries where the vast majority of the world 
largest and longest-standing refugee population, 
namely the Palestinians, still live.
None of these countries, and not even Turkey, 
regards itself as country of durable settlement for 
new refugees. Three of them – Lebanon, Jordan and 
Iraq – are not party to the Geneva Refugee Conven-
tion. They do not grant proper refugee status to 
those fleeing violence in neighboring countries, but 
instead give refugees an ill-defined denomination 
as “guests”. These “guests” are sometimes generously 
hosted and protected, but most of the time they are 
denied all the basic rights that would make settle-
ment an option (work, access to services, etc.), even 
though history shows that guests may wait a lifetime 
and never return home. And, indeed, there is a wide-
spread sentiment that many Syrian refugees will not 
easily return to Syria once security is restored.
Beyond economics, the social equilibrium and the 
political stability of the countries of first asylum are 
put at risk by the massive influx of Syrian refugees. It 
has to be borne in mind that nations are not the only 
lines structuring this part of the world. Religious 
and ethnic communities which span nations are 
also of paramount importance. Those fleeing Syria, 
be they Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Christian Arabs, 
Muslim Kurds or Syrian Palestinians, naturally find 
shelter within their community on the other side of 
the border. With numbers growing their mere pres-
ence can become a trigger fanning dormant tensions 
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alight. Moreover, camps and informal settlements 
sheltering the refugees might easily become hotbeds 
for terrorist organizations.
Unless the Geneva peace talks bring a miracle, the 
situation in Syria will continue to deteriorate. In the 
coming months, new refugees will cross the border 
and those who have left Syria will stay where they 
have found shelter. It is very likely that tensions will 
keep growing in the countries of first asylum. Can the 
world, and in particular Europe, afford any further 
political deterioration in the Middle East? It is high 
time for Europe to find a proper response to the 
current refugee crisis and consider sharing the burden 
of the crisis more effectively with the countries of first 
asylum. What burden should be shared —the refu-
gees or their cost— remains to be seen.
Burden-sharing could consist of taking more refu-
gees currently hosted in the Arab countries and 
Turkey into the EU. Various tools already exist for 
this, such as: resettling more of the refugees currently 
hosted in countries neighboring on Syria; delivering 
asylum or humanitarian visas in European embas-
sies in the Middle East to avoid obstacles set up at 
the EU’s external border; exempting Syrian citizens 
from visa requirements while the conflict is active; 
or using the existing channels of family reunification 
for legal entry into the EU.
While all these solutions must be seriously explored 
and, as far as possible, implemented, it is impor-
tant to remember that: not all Syrian refugees can 
be admitted to the EU (they are too numerous); not 
all of them would want to go to Europe were they 
offered a place (e.g. families with children who are to 
be taught in Arabic); and what is good for individuals 
may do harm to the society of origin (for example, if 
those admitted to Europe happen to be those most 
needed to rebuild Syria once the war there ends).
Burden-sharing must also mean solidarity with 
countries of first asylum so that there is the determi-
nation to jointly bear the costs of the refugee crisis. 
Through which actors should humanitarian aid be 
channeled in order to best serve the refugees them-
selves and at the same time prevent their presence 
generating social and political tensions? In addition 
to the usual recipients —international organiza-
tions, NGOs and governments— municipalities and 
local administrations should be targeted, for they 
are tasked with helping the daily lives of people and 
are ideally placed to bridge the gap between refugees 
and their hosts.
Just as the Syrian peace talks in Geneva take place 
against the backdrop of Switzerland voting for immi-
gration quotas, the Syrian refugee crisis reaches 
Europe during the deepest economic crisis since 
World War II, with citizens’ income plummeting, 
unemployment soaring and public opinion lumping 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants together. 
However, Europe must open the door wider to 
Syrian refugees for the sake of its defining values. 
For the sake of regional security in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, it must open its cash till wider, too, 
so as to be able to give humanitarian aid. In both 
instances there is the duty to inform EU citizens 
about the need for asylum and international soli-
darity, but no politician seems ready to take on that 
particular task.
Content © Authors, 2014
© European University Institute, 2014
5 ■  Migration Policy Centre ■ 14 February 2014
Migration Policy Centre 
The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced research 
on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, imple-
menting and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy 
and society. The Migration Policy Centre is co-financed by the European Union.
Migration Policy Centre Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - European University Institute 
Via delle Fontanelle 19I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy
Tel: (+39) 055 4685 817
Fax: (+39) 055 4685 770
mpc@eui.eu
Complete information on our activities can be found online at: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
